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Introduction 
 
This article examines the influence and role of Korean businesses in shaping the ROK-U.S. 
alliance, studying the case of the Korea-U.S. free trade agreement (KORUS FTA). For more 
than half a century, the ROK-U.S. alliance has played a security role in preserving peace and 
stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. Based on common ideology and 
values, the alliance has also functioned as an important institutional foundation for a strong 
bilateral economic and commercial relationship that has underpinned common security and 
prosperity. Despite fluctuations in the global security and economic environment, the 
bilateral partnership has widened and deepened in all dimensions of inter-state relations 
through security, economic, and cultural ties.    
 
However, the last ten years has seriously tested the ROK-U.S. alliance. U.S. reassessment of 
Korea‟s strategic value for the twenty-first century called for some structural adjustments to 
the alliance. Similarly, responding to both domestic and external changes, Korea sought a 
more equal relationship with the United States. Differences over policy toward North Korea 
highlighted divergent views between the two allies.  
 
A new vision for the ROK-U.S. alliance was set forth in June 2009. A major catalyst of such 
realignment of the alliance is the KORUS FTA. The proposed KORUS FTA would serve as 
an agent of momentum transforming the alliance from a solely military alliance to a 
comprehensive security-economic partnership. This strengthened framework for Korea-U.S 
cooperation would provide a much stronger basis for peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia 
in the future.  
 
                                            

 This paper was originally presented at a workshop on the “Influence and Role of Domestic Stakeholders on the 
U.S.-ROK Alliance,” Center for U.S.-Korea Policy and the East Asia Institute, Seoul, February 22, 2010. 
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The Korea-U.S. military alliance has served as a sturdy pillar of peace and security on the 
Korean peninsula for more than 50 years. Security cooperation will continue to be a key pillar 
of the ROK-U.S. alliance in the twenty-first century. However, it is no longer the only pillar. 
The United States and Korea enjoy deep and strong economic ties, evidenced by the dramatic 
expansion of the bilateral economic relationship.
1
 This economic and commercial 
relationship is another core pillar of the Korea-U.S. partnership. 
 
Then, what are the domestic roots of the transforming ROK-U.S. alliance? More specifically, 
what roles have Korean big businesses played in the evolution of the alliance and emergence 
of the KORUS FTA? The changing characteristics of the alliance should be traced to both 
international and domestic forces on the one hand, and both political and economic forces, on 
the other.
2
 This suggests that it is very difficult and even foolhardy to try to single out a few 
key variables to explain the emerging changes in Korea-U.S. relations. 
 
In fact, many studies on Korea‟s foreign policy in general and the Korea-U.S. relationship in 
particular, appear trapped in the so-called analytical double divide: between high and low 
politics, and between state and society as a key actor. Korea-U.S. relations have been 
considered, for the most part, as high politics in which security and strategic concerns 
dominate the discourse and the decision-making powers reside in state actors, primarily top 
executives. Under the so-called imperial presidentialism, presidents have had overwhelming 
authority in making foreign policies. Thus, there was little room for an independent role of 
both low politics and societal actors like business interests in the formation of Korean foreign 
policy including ROK-U.S. alliance policy. To that extent, the need for studying the role of 
societal forces on foreign policy has been relatively minimal. 
 
However, such a closed system of foreign policymaking began to open under the Kim Dae 
Jung administration. More fundamental changes were made under the Roh Moo-hyun 
administration, when foreign policy issues including issues related to the ROK-U.S. alliance 
often stood at the center of debate among Koreans. Under these circumstances, a multi-
stakeholder model becomes more relevant in explaining Korean foreign policy behavior.
3
 
 
Using a case study of the development of the KORUS FTA, this paper explores the influence 
of Korean business stakeholders on the transformation of the ROK-U.S. alliance, a question 
                                            
1
 Korea is the United States‟ seventh-largest trading partner and among its largest markets for agricultural 
products. The United States is Korea‟s third-largest trading partner, second-largest export market, third-largest 
source of imports, and its second largest supplier of foreign direct investment (FDI). 
2
 For an analysis of domestic factors, see Allison (1989). 
3
 According to Ruggie (2005), there are two different traditions in diplomacy. In the traditionalist culture, state 
actors take key part, whereas the modernist culture emphasizes the role of a wide range of internal and external 
stakeholders. 
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which has been largely neglected in existing studies. The paper‟s primary finding is that, 
since South Korea‟s 1987 democratization, the Korean business community has increased its 
voice and influence on foreign policy toward the United States, and has contributed to 
strengthening the domestic support base for KORUS FTA negotiations, mainly through 
building internal and external advocacy networks. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the foundations of the Korean 
business sector‟s influence on the ROK-U.S. alliance. I underline that there was a historical 
affinity between the growth and interests of Korean businesses on the one hand, and the 
alliance as well as the government, on the other. In Section II, along with a discussion of its 
strengths and weaknesses, I sketch the background, process, and current status of the KORUS 
FTA. Section III analyzes the roles the Korean business community has played in moving the 
KORUS FTA forward, with a focus on the Federation of Korean Industry (FKI), a 
representative organization of business interests in South Korea. This analysis is followed by 
an inquiry into FKI‟s priority concerns and strategies in expanding Korea-U.S joint business 
interests and involvement in the ROK-U.S. alliance. In Section IV, I draw some implications 
of Korean businesses‟ increasing influence on the deepening of Korea-U.S cooperation. I 
conclude by discussing the potential benefits of the KORUS FTA on bilateral, regional, and 
global dimensions. 
 
 
Historical Overview 
 
The Korean Business Sector and the ROK-U.S. Alliance 
 
A historical review of the influence of the Korean business sector on the ROK-U.S. alliance 
indicates that it has been, at best, marginal until the 1990s, but turned relatively striking in the 
2000s. One reason for this limited role was that the Cold War and inter-Korean division did 
not allow any government to seriously challenge the reason of existence of the alliance. Also, 
for most of the time period under analysis, the Korean government had been a patron vis-à-
vis the business community. The latter was simply a client heavily dependent upon the 
benefits provided by the Korean government. Therefore, supporting the ROK-U.S. alliance 
was the default position of businesses and other societal actors, and as far as the alliance was 
concerned, it was an area of government monopoly. As the proposed KORUS FTA became 
more important in the new millennium, the voice of businesses became more assertive in 
emphasizing the need for strengthened Korea-U.S cooperation than ever before. 
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The post-1945 evolution of Korea-U.S. relations illustrates well the development of a unique 
interaction between military alliance and economic cooperation. During the Cold War, close 
security cooperation actually led to friendly political relations between the two countries. 
And the relative benefits of South Korea‟s military alliance with the United States were not 
confined solely to the area of security, but extended to the economic realm as well. The 
Korea-U.S. bilateral relationship during that period represents some characteristics of a 
“patron-client relationship” in which the client state receives security assistance at the cost of 
political autonomy, and the patron supports the client‟s economy for military and ideological 
reasons.
4
 
 
This patron-client relationship at the inter-state level was reproduced in the government-
business relations of Korea. Very few Koreans had owned or managed large corporations 
under Japanese colonial rule. The birth of Korean capitalists was linked to the military 
alliance between Korea and the United States, in the sense that they emerged under the shield 
of the U.S and Korean governments. After the departure of the Japanese in 1945, the 
American military authority allowed some Korean businessmen to obtain the assets of some 
of the Japanese firms, many of which grew into the chaebol (business conglomerates) of the 
1990s   
 
There were two channels through which American assistance helped Korean big businesses 
take off. First, the firms could either get aid money directly or purchase aid materials through 
rationing or competitive auction bidding. They acquired resource materials and facility 
equipment necessary for production activities, and made big profits since the difference 
between real and nominal exchange rates was large at the time. Second, of more importance 
were the counterpart funds which were formed with U.S economic aid and managed by the 
Korean government. These funds were the main source of Korea‟s treasury loans and 
investments, most of which were provided to the large firms.
5
  
 
In fact, this U.S economic aid was primarily military-related since the use of the counterpart 
funds was thoroughly controlled by the United States under the “Meyer Agreement” of 1952 
on ROK-U.S. economic coordination, which stipulated that the Combined Economic Board 
controlled operation and disposal of the funds. In particular, the military purpose of the funds 
appeared clear in Article 1(a) of the Agreement‟s guiding principles: “The Board will 
consider all economic aspects of the Unified Command programs for assistance to the 
Republic of Korea and all pertinent aspects of the economy and programs of the Republic of 
                                            
4
 For a discussion of the positive relationship between military alliance and trade cooperation, see Gowa and 
Mansfield(1993). 
5
 The cumulative counterpart fund between 1954 and 1964 amounted to 83.3 billion won, 57.37 percent of the 
total treasury loans and investments of 145 billion won. 
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Korea, in order that each of the Board's recommendations may be a part of a consistent 
overall program designed to provide maximum support to the military effort of the United 
Nations Command in Korea, relieve the hardships of the people of Korea, and develop a 
stable Korean economy.” Thus, in the 1950-60s, Korean big businesses were one-sided 
beneficiaries and important supporters of the ROK-U.S. alliance, which shaped the formation 
of Korean business group attitudes toward Korea-U.S. relations. 
 
The anti-communist and authoritarian regimes of South Korea considered the ROK-U.S. 
alliance as the most important pillar of peace and prosperity for Koreans, and pushed the 
strategy of export-oriented industrialization (EOI). Since 1973, the Park Chung-Hee 
government emphasized greater economic independence as well as military build-up, and 
promoted heavy and chemical industries. Main policy instruments included encouraging 
monopolistic production, reducing tariffs on capital equipment, raising tariffs to protect infant 
industries, and providing favored sectors with privileged access to bank loans. These shifts in 
economic policy favored large firms, as a result of which the top 30 chaebols‟ share of 
manufacturing shipments amounted to 35 percent and their share of total exports 41.3 percent 
in 1985 (Jee 1997). Taking a leading role in promoting economic growth and holding huge 
economic resources, these big businesses began to have a greater influence on the Korean 
political economy.  
 
The 1980s saw the previous patron-client relationship between businesses and government 
transforming into a symbiotic one in which the government still played a leading, yet not 
unilateral, role in decision making of both domestic and foreign affairs. As trade frictions in 
the mid-1980s showed, Korea-U.S. relations were also diverging from a patron-client 
relationship. After South Korea‟s democratic transition in 1987 and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1991, state-society relations were realigned in favor of societal actors including 
business sectors. At the same time, low politics seemed to become more important through 
economic cooperation with former communist countries and trade conflicts with the United 
States. 
 
However, South Korea‟s foreign policymaking process remained largely intact. As long as 
Korea-U.S. relations were concerned, high politics still dominated low politics. Foreign 
policymaking remained primarily in the domain of the president, who was largely insulated 
from democratic control and public participation (Jaung 2005: 51). There was no serious 
conflict of interests between the government and societal actors about the indispensability of 
the ROK-U.S. alliance, so concerns of the Korean business community were confined to the 
economic arena. In reality, the Federation of Korean Industry, the umbrella interest group of 
large firms, showed little interest in foreign policy and even appeared incompetent in 
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promoting their agenda to the government. Although the portion of FKI‟s policy proposals 
with an international orientation amounted to only 0.7 percent in the 1995-2000 period, their 
overall rate of acceptance was as high as 70 percent (Choi 2005). 
 
During the 2002 presidential campaign, Korea-U.S. alliance issues suddenly emerged as 
politically salient issues when a U.S. Military Court‟s acquittal of U.S. soldiers who 
accidentally killed two middle-school girls during off-base training exercise triggered 
nationwide candle-light vigils against the actions of both the American and Korean 
governments in November 2002. The role of Korea-stationed American troops and the future 
of the ROK-U.S. alliance became crucial issues in the campaign, ahead of South Korea‟s first 
democratic election in which foreign policy played a major role (Jaung 2005). Since the 
beginning of the Roh Moo-hyun administration, foreign policy issues often stood at the center 
of debate in Korea, including U.S. alliance-related issues such as troop dispatch to Iraq, the 
realignment of the ROK-U.S. alliance, and KORUS FTA negotiations. 
 
As societal stakeholders have actively participated in foreign policy debates, Korean big 
businesses have functioned as a stronghold for justifying the ROK-U.S. alliance. It was not 
an accident that Samsung Economic Research Institute (SERI) published a paper on ROK-
U.S. relations for the first time in 2004, arguing that the then looming cracks of the alliance 
might have detrimental effects on the Korean economy, and calling for strengthening Korea-
U.S. cooperation at the security, economic, and social levels (SERI 2004).
6
 The report also 
emphasized that a free trade agreement between the two nations would expand the previous 
security-oriented alliance into a more comprehensive framework of cooperation. As 
discussed below, Korean business groups have argued that the KORUS FTA would 
strengthen Korea-U.S. relations by transforming the military alliance into a military-
economic alliance. 
 
Progress of the KORUS FTA 
 
The idea of a Korea-U.S. FTA is traceable to the 1980s, when South Korea‟s accessibility to 
U.S markets was increasingly squeezed by U.S trade laws and the conclusion of the Canada-
U.S FTA. The Korean government had an interest in a bilateral trade pact with the United 
States as a means to avoiding further discrimination against Korean exports to the U.S market. 
But U.S interests centered mainly on how an FTA could further open Korean markets and 
help promote the multilateral process of trade liberalization at the GATT rounds. Initial 
ROK-U.S. FTA talks failed to go beyond informal discussions, although a number of studies 
                                            
6
 The publication sought to examine the most outstanding political and economic issues for CEOs and policy 
makers. 
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in both nations explored the potential economic and geopolitical implications of an FTA 
(Choi and Schott 2001).
7
 While these early attempts bore no fruits, interest in a bilateral 
trade pact resurfaced in the late 1990s.  
 
For Korea, the economic crisis in late 1997 forced a thorough review of development 
strategies. The government thought that new trade agreements could help make the Korean 
economy more efficient by promoting inflows of foreign capital and management skills, and 
by infusing new competition into the domestic market. At the same time, there has been a 
dramatic resurgence of bilateral trade deals in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan began FTA talks 
with Singapore in January 2001, has held extensive consultations with Korea on the 
possibility of entering free trade negotiations, and has explored the idea of trade talks with 
Mexico with support from a bilateral business working group. At the APEC summit meeting 
in 2000, Singapore agreed with Australia and with the United States to launch FTA talks. 
 
Nonetheless, the subject of a Korea-U.S. FTA had not been discussed formally between the 
two governments until December 2000.  Ahead of these negotiations, the U.S business 
community in Korea promoted the idea of a bilateral FTA in a letter to President Clinton in 
June 1999.
8
 Senator Max Baucus, ranking minority member of the Senate Finance 
Committee, introduced the United States-Republic of Korea Free Trade Agreement Act of 
1999 in November of that year that would authorize FTA negotiations with Korea as well as 
„„fast-track‟‟ procedures to implement the resulting agreement.  In January 2001, leading 
Korean and U.S. businesses both expressed their support for a potential Korea-U.S FTA.
9
 
 
The Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) proposed an FTA to the U.S. 
government in 2004. After the four preconditions on rice, beef, screen quota, and emission 
standards of imported cars were cleared, both governments announced the launch of the first 
official round of FTA negotiations on February 3, 2006. The KORUS FTA was signed on 
June 30, 2007, but ratification of the agreement stalled over differences between the George 
W. Bush administration and a Democrat-controlled U.S. Congress that expressed objections 
to the treaty related to concerns over bilateral trade in automobiles and U.S. beef exports.  
 
Nearly three years later, on June 26, 2010, Presidents Obama and Lee Myung-bak agreed that 
they would direct their governments to resolve remaining obstacles to the agreement by 
November 2010. After intensive discussions including talks during the November 2010 G-20 
                                            
7
 The U.S International Trade Commission concluded in 1989 that a U.S-Korea FTA was premature, citing 
possible negative political effects (Choi and Schott 2001) . 
8
 Letter from Jeffrey Jones, president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Korea, to President Clinton, 
June 29, 1999.  
9
 The 14th Joint Steering Committee Meeting of the U.S-Korea Business Council, January 21-23, 2001. 
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Seoul summit, the two presidents announced on December 4, 2010, that a deal had been 
reached.
10
 On February 10, 2011, the United States and Korea exchanged the legal texts – 
signed by U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk and Korean Trade Minister Kim Jong-Hoon – 
setting the stage for Congressional consideration of the KORUS FTA. 
 
The pending KORUS FTA seeks to bring benefits to both sides. The view that South Korea 
wants greater access to the world‟s richest market and that the FTA will help revive its 
economy, is generally accepted in Korea. President Lee in his National Assembly address in 
July 2008 stated that the KORUS FTA “will boost the nation‟s economy.” Korea‟s interest in 
enhanced access to the U.S. market was recognized by U.S. Trade Representative Susan 
Schwab, who indicated that the FTA would exchange much higher Korean barriers for access 
to the American market. Also, the United States would like to use the FTA to prevent its own 
exclusion from Asia, a potential reality with the formation of Asian regional groupings. The 
FTA provides the United States a way to move Korea towards a more open economy and 
away from past practices of regulation and industry protection.  
 
For the United States, an FTA with Korea would increase bilateral trade and investment, with 
an increase in agricultural and services exports to Korea in particular. The United States 
could also use its expanded access to the Korean market as a platform for sourcing 
throughout Northeast Asia. The KORUS FTA could also serve as a catalyst to jump-start the 
next stage of regional free trade movements within APEC and as a building bloc to the 
further progress of the multilateral trading system. Politically, the United States could benefit 
from a further strengthening of its security ties with Korea that could result from an FTA. 
The trade agreement would send a signal of firm U.S. commitment to a prosperous Korea and 
to peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia. 
 
Despite such opportunities, there still exist challenges to be dealt with by both governments. 
Among others, ratification of the FTA has been delayed in both countries longer than 
expected. There is also strong opposition from the potential losers in both Korea and the 
United States. Furthermore, the nature of the issues has turned ideological rather than 
economic in Korea, as a result of which pro-American groups and conservatives have 
collided with anti-American groups and progressives. The following section analyzes the 
domestic impact of the KORUS FTA and overviews the distribution of business sector 
interests. Then, it discusses the priorities of leading Korean businesses and their roles in 
pushing forward the FTA. 
                                            
10
 Under the renegotiated trade pact, concessions were granted to the United States on trade in automobiles.  
Tariff reductions for Korean automobiles were delayed for five years, and U.S. autos were granted broader 
access to the Korean market. At the same time, the negotiators agreed to set aside disagreements over U.S. beef 
exports for the time being. 
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Korean Businesses and Politics of the KORUS FTA  
 
Sectoral Impact of the KORUS FTA 
 
A trade pact has significant distributional implications because it is likely to change the 
previous allocation of benefits and costs among domestic interests. The preferences of 
different domestic stakeholders in foreign economic policymaking can be analyzed by using 
Rogowski‟s (1989) commerce and coalitions model. The premise of this model is that 
economic cleavages between stakeholder constituencies are formed on the basis of their 
exposure to trade which is assumed to have either beneficial or adverse effects on them. 
 
A number of studies have estimated the economic impact of a possible Korea-U.S. FTA in 
the last decade, including those of the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC), several 
Korean and U.S. research groups and other researchers. Wang and Cheong (1998) produced 
the first published computable general equilibrium analysis of the topic in 1998. Both the 
Peterson Institute for International Economics and the ITC in Washington have published a 
series of estimates for a U.S.-Korea FTA.
11
 Regardless of model, base year, and 
liberalization scenario, they predicted that total U.S. exports to Korea would increase by more 
than the increase in total imports from Korea, in both percentage and value terms. 
 
For Korea, the agriculture and service sectors are expected to be on the losers‟ side, whereas 
manufacturing industries, except pharmaceutics,
12
 will remain relatively immune from the 
negative effects of the FTA (see table 1). Under the KORUS FTA's provisions on agricultural 
trade, Korea immediately would grant duty-free status to almost two-thirds of current U.S. 
agricultural exports. Tariffs and import quotas on most other agricultural goods would be 
phased out within 10 years, with the remaining commodities and products subject to 
provisions that phase out such protection. Korea also agreed to eliminate its 40 percent tariff 
on beef imported from the United States over a 15 year period, while holding rights to impose 
safeguard tariffs on a temporary basis in response to any potential surge in imports of U.S. 
beef meats above specified levels. For the United States, as the American Farm Bureau 
Federation has estimated, the KORUS FTA, once fully implemented, could increase U.S. 
farm exports to Korea by $1.6 billion, a fact which may explain why the KORUS FTA is 
supported by more than 40 U.S. agricultural and food associations.
13
 On the contrary, 
                                            
11
 Choi and Schott (2001), Schott et.al(2006), Schott(2010), U.S ITC (2001, 2007). 
12
 Under the new trade agreement, the United States agreed to extend the grace period of a pharmaceutical 
“patent linkage” system to three years instead of 18 months, which may reduce the predicted losses of Korean 
companies by 110 billion to 238.2 billion Won. 
13
 USTR. “KORUS FTA: New Opportunities for Agriculture.” KORUS FTA Facts, June 2008. 
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Korea‟s farmers would be the biggest losers from the FTA. Some experts have estimated that 
the FTA would result in 1 million job losses in Korea‟s agricultural sector.14  
 
Table 1. Sectoral Effects of the KORUS FTA in South Korea 
Sector Export Import Losses 
Agriculture X ● ● 
Manufacturing 
Textile/clothing ● X X 
Automobile ○ ○ X 
Electronics/IT ◐ ○ X 
Pharmaceutical X ● ● 
Services 
Finance X ● ◐ 
Education X ● ◐ 
Legal/medical X ◐ ◐ 
Source: SERI(2006), ●= very great, ◐= great, ○= small, X= negligible 
 
Trade in autos and auto parts has proved to be among the most difficult issues tackled by U.S 
and Korean negotiators, pitting an increasingly competitive Korean industry seeking to 
increase its U.S. market share against a U.S industry that wants Korea to eliminate policies 
and practices that seemingly discriminate against U.S. auto imports. Under the renegotiated 
agreement the U.S car tariff - currently at 2.5 percent - will be maintained for four years until 
January 2016 and then eliminated. In turn, for Korea, the 8 percent Korean car tariff will be 
reduced to 4 percent upon entry into force of the pact and then eliminated at the same time as 
the elimination of the U.S. car tariff. Also, rather than a 10-year tariff phase-out, tariffs on 
electric cars and plug-in hybrids will be phased out in five years. In addition, the U.S tariff on 
light trucks will be maintained for seven years until 2019 and then phased out over the next 
three years. Originally, the light truck tariff was to be phased out in 10 equal annual 
increments, but Korea did not slow its own tariff reform, meaning that the 10 percent Korean 
truck tariff will be eliminated upon entry into force of the agreement.  
 
The KORUS FTA would cover a broad range of other areas. Most U.S.-Korean trade in 
consumer and industrial products would become duty-free within three years after the 
agreement enters into force, and virtually all remaining tariffs would be lifted within 10 years. 
The two countries agreed to liberalize trade in services by opening up their markets beyond 
what they have committed under the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). About 
60 percent of bilateral trade in textiles and apparel would become duty-free immediately, and 
                                            
14
 Under the new agreement, the 25 percent Korean tariff on imports of a major category of U.S. frozen pork 
will be phased out by January 2016 instead of January 2014. 
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the KORUS FTA would provide a special safeguard mechanism to reduce the impact of 
textile and apparel import surges. 
   
In sum, the Korean producers of autos, textiles and clothing, and electronics will be winners 
and farmers will be losers. This suggests that most Korean export-oriented, especially large 
multinational, manufacturing businesses will benefit from--and hence strongly support--the 
KORUS FTA. 
 
Role of Korean Big Businesses 
 
The main concerns of the Korean business community have been whether an FTA would 
provide increased access to the U.S market and hence lead to economies of scale. Until the 
first half of the 2000s, Korean big businesses seemed very cautious about a free trade deal 
with the United States. For example, LG Economic Research Institute (1998) concluded that 
a Korea-U.S. FTA would aggravate the current account deficits of Korea, but the positive 
effect of improving the deficits was not certain. SERI (SERI 2003) also pointed out that the 
strongest candidates for an FTA partner included Japan and China, and that an FTA with the 
United States should be approached from a strategic and long-term perspective. In a similar 
vein, Korea Economic Research Institute (KERI) published a policy brief indicating that the 
lineup for FTA candidates should be ordered as Japan first, then Mexico, ASEAN, BRICs 
and the United States last (Kwon 2004). Thus, at the early stage, Korean big businesses 
placed a low priority on the United States.   
 
Nonetheless, once FTA negotiations between Korea and the U.S were officially launched on 
February 3, 2006, Korean businesses took various proactive steps to move it forward. The 
following section analyzes this in two dimensions - key players and activities – of pro-
KORUS FTA movements, as shown in table 2. Notable players include the five biggest 
business organizations: the Federation of Korean Industry (FKI), the Korea Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry (KORCHAM), the Korea Federation of Small and Medium Business 
(Kbiz), the Korea International Trade Association (KITA), and the Korea Employers 
Federation (KEF). Of FTA-related networks, the KORUS FTA Industry Alliance and the 
Korea-U.S Business Council played an important role in pro-FTA campaigns either within 
Korea or between the two nations.
15
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
15
 The movement against the FTA deal was staged mainly by the Korea Alliance against the Korea-U.S. FTA. 
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Table 2. Key Player and Activity of Pro-KORUS FTA Campaign 
 
Player Activity 
Organization Network Advocacy Education 
FKI 
(KORCHAM, Kbiz 
KITA, KEF) 
KORUS FTA Industry 
Alliance 
Petition Statement 
Proposal Report 
Korea-U.S Business Council Meeting Public hearing, conference, 
seminar, forum 
 
The activities in support of KORUS FTA are categorized into advocacy and education. 
According to Duverger (1972: 121-125), the modes of political participation are either direct 
or indirect. Direct participation is associated with policymaker-oriented, advocacy activities, 
whereas indirect participation is related to mass-level, educational ones. Advocacy is 
performed through both open and private channels which link business leaders to various 
decision makers such as government ministers, bureaucrats, legislators, and regulators. The 
basic objective of business leaders is to change the government‟s policy positions in 
accordance with their business interests. Widely-used methods of engaging policy makers are 
meetings and policy petitions, recommendations, and proposals. Educational activities aim to 
widen the support base of the mass public through public hearings, statements, reports, and 
scholarly conferences. 
 
The subsequent analysis focuses on the advocacy and educational roles played by FKI, which 
has been not only an umbrella organization of Korean business conglomerates, but also the 
focal point of pro-KORUS FTA movement networks in Korea including the Industry 
Alliance and the Korea-U.S. Business Council.
16
 Table 3 shows FKI‟s pattern of political 
participation between 2003 and 2010. The portion of FKI‟s advocacy activities directly 
engaging policymakers has ranged from 17 percent in 2008 to 31 percent in 2010. FKI‟s main 
focus has been overwhelmingly on the executive branch during the whole period under study. 
But the legislative branch received a relatively weaker spotlight from FKI than the executive 
counterpart given that the portion of advocacy activities focused on the legislative branch 
went beyond 6 percent only in the years 2004 and 2009. 
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 FKI‟s membership increased from 13 since its inception in July 17, 1961 to 486 companies in 2010. 
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Table 3. FKI and Modes of Political Participation 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Advocacy Executive [A]  30 25 36 40 34 19 27 37 
 (A/D) 22.39  16.13  23.84  25.00  25.00  13.77  20.00  25.69  
 Legislature [B] 4 15 3 7 3 5 10 8 
  (B/D) 2.99  9.68  1.99  4.38  2.21  3.62  7.41  5.56  
Education [C]   100 115 112 113 99 114 98 99 
  (C/D) 74.63  74.19  74.17  70.63  72.79  82.61  72.59  68.75  
Total [D] 134 155 151 160 136 138 135 144 
Source: Author‟s calculation from FKI Chronology 
 
It was not until the establishment of the bilateral investment treaty (BIT)/FTA Task Force 
under the Korea-U.S. Business Council in 2003 that FKI entered into the landscape of 
KORUS FTA politics in Korea. Signing a Memorandum of Understanding with MOFAT in 
March 18, 2003, FKI also opened an official circuit through which its voice was transmitted 
into the foreign economic policymaking procedures. FKI in April 23, 2004, established an 
internal agency, the Committee on Commerce and Trade, which, with the participation of 
MOFAT officials, aimed to prepare business-level strategies to cope with international 
economic challenges and to voice business sector concerns at the phase of not only 
negotiating an FTA deal, but also selecting an FTA partner country. Six months later, the 
Committee called for a Korea-U.S. FTA and became an important foundation for forming the 
KORUS FTA Industry Alliance in February 3, 2006. 
The KORUS FTA Industry Alliance was a domestic policy network in which government 
officials, corporate managers, and economists participated.
17
 The alliance is comprised of 
some 42 groups including the Korea International Trade Association and FKI. The main 
purpose of the alliance was to promote the interest of Korean businesses. Its activities include 
to review major issues in FTA negotiation groups, and to examine possible countermeasures 
and responses by sector and by industry. It monitored developments of negotiations, tried to 
reflect industrial opinions in the course of government negotiations, and exchanged 
information and opinion between industries to increase mutual understanding. 
 
The Korea-U.S. Business Council has served as FKI‟s important international network, the 
premier business organization promoting the bilateral relationship between the United States 
and Korea. The Council also serves as secretariat of the KORUS FTA Business Coalition, a 
broad-based group of over 400 American businesses and associations that is working to 
secure Congressional approval of the FTA. In 1999, FKI assumed responsibility as secretariat 
                                            
17
 This group was recently renamed “FTA Industry Alliance” as it seeks to discuss strategies for promoting the 
interests of Korean businesses in FTAs in general, including the KORUS FTA.  
Domestic Stakeholders Center for U.S.-Korea Policy  
 14 
of the Korea-U.S Business Council, and in 2002, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce became 
secretariat of the U.S. counterpart, the U.S.-Korea Business Council. The founding mission of 
the two councils was to foster better business ties between the United States and Korea, and 
to promote the bilateral economic and political relationship in order to expand trade and 
investment. Through dialogue, joint working groups, and other unilateral and joint initiatives, 
the councils for twenty years have led efforts in both the United States and Korea to improve 
the bilateral trade and investment environment. 
   
More importantly, the councils were early advocates for a Korea-U.S. FTA, first urging U.S. 
and Korean government leaders in 2000 to consider entering into FTA negotiations in order 
to boost bilateral trade. The councils actively worked to promote the conclusion of BIT 
negotiations and led calls for the opening of bilateral FTA negotiations.
18
 The Korea-U.S. 
Business Council established the BIT/FTA Task Force in January 2003 to discuss possible 
solutions to commercial tensions between Korea and the United States, and in February 2006, 
launched the U.S.-Korea FTA Business Coalition in conjunction with the announcement by 
the U.S and Korean governments of their intention to enter into FTA talks. The two business 
councils have represented an important institutional linkage lobbying both Korea‟s National 
Assembly and the U.S Congress for early ratification of the trade pact. 
 
Based on the above institutional foundations, Korean businesses could make the government 
adopt 27 out of 51 policy proposals concerning KORUS FTA negotiations.
19
 The pro-
KORUS campaign was slightly different in focus between the pre- and post-2007 periods: 
during the earlier period, it surveyed the interests of member firms and tried to promote them 
in the negotiation process, while in the later period, efforts were made to shape opinion in 
favor of early ratification of the signed KORUS FTA. On the one hand, the FKI leadership, 
aligned with the chairmen of other large business associations, had several times visited the 
National Assembly and major political parties to persuade Korean legislators (see table 4). 
On the other hand, FKI promulgated the joint statements of business associations, published 
op-ed articles, released TV and newspaper commercials, and sponsored seminars and forums 
to emphasize the positive economic, political, and security implications of the KORUS 
FTA.
20
 
                                            
18
 Joint Statement, the 13th Joint Conference of Korea-U.S./U.S.-Korea Business Councils, June 20, 2000. 
19
 FKI Annual Report 2007. 
20
 FKI Annual Reports 2008 and 2009. 
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Table 4. Lobbying Activities for KORUS FTA Ratification 
 
Date Organization Activity 
2007.6.14 Korea-U.S Business Council Statement 
2008.1.9 FKI Statement 
2008.1.14 FTA Industry Alliance Visit to National Assembly 
2008.2.5 FKI Statement 
2009.2.18 Four Business Associations Visit to National Assembly 
2009.2.24 Six Business Associations Statement & Visit to National 
Assembly  
2009.4.24 Five Business Associations Invitation of Speaker of National 
Assembly 
2009.11.18 FTA Industry Alliance Visit to National Assembly 
Source: FKI Chronology 
 
 
KORUS FTA and the ROK-U.S. Alliance: Bilateral and Regional Benefits 
 
The KORUS FTA is expected to broaden and deepen the ROK-U.S. alliance. Although 
Korean businesses have been interested primarily in the economic effects of the FTA, they 
also are attentive to its implications for the alliance and general bilateral cooperation. For 
instance, Kang Shin-Ho, chairman of FKI indicated in 2006, “The Korea-U.S. FTA is 
expected to greatly contribute to developing the nation's service industry and helping the 
nation secure transparent accounting system, flexible labor market, and other global 
standards.” He added, “The Korea-U.S. FTA will also strengthen diplomatic and security 
relations between the two countries and have positive impacts on the peace of the Korean 
Peninsula and maintenance of order in Northeast Asia.
21
 The U.S.-Korea Business Council 
has also indicated that the FTA would significantly expand bilateral trade and investment, 
and bring new vitality to the U.S. partnership with Korea, and in doing so contribute to Asia‟s 
future trade and investment environment.
22
 
                                            
21
 FKI. “Korea-U.S. FTA Should Be Used as a Springboard for Take-off Toward Advanced Country.” FKI 
Newsletter, CEO Message. Vol. 35, 2006-03. 
22
 “U.S.-Korea Business Council Applauds Signing of U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement.” Statement of U.S-
Korea Business Council. June 30, 2007. 
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Thus, the impact of the KORUS FTA may go far beyond bilateral commercial benefits. It 
would represent a powerful symbol of the Korea-U.S. partnership, augmenting the 
longstanding bilateral security alliance and robust ties between the Korean and American 
people. It will create a new dynamic, reflecting both the growing sophistication of the 
bilateral relationship and Korea‟s increasingly positive global role.   
 
There are several mutual bilateral and regional gains that could be achieved from the KORUS 
FTA.  First, the KORUS FTA is expected to significantly strengthen the bilateral strategic 
partnership between Korea and the United States amid the always-fragile political and 
security dynamic of Northeast Asia. North Korea‟s nuclear tests and military provocations 
have prompted speculation of a future arms race in the region, as a result of which the global 
community has grown more convinced that the Korean peninsula should seek wiser policies 
to deal with peninsular security issues and avoid a resurgence of Cold War thinking in the 
region. The presence of more than 30,000 U.S. troops in Korea makes the United States an 
interested party in security matters. The KORUS FTA, as Washington‟s first free trade 
agreement in East Asia, would mark the beginning of a more fruitful bilateral partnership 
going forward. The FTA is desirable for Korea as a means to develop a better strategic 
relationship with the United States, allowing Korea‟s opinions on East Asia and North Korea 
to carry more weight.  
 
The KORUS FTA would serve as a stepping stone to integrating North Korea into the global 
community. In particular, part of the FTA provides for the establishment of a Committee on 
Outward Processing Zones on the Korean peninsula. Under this provision, products made in 
designated “outward processing zones” in North Korea and financially supported by Korean 
firms could eventually be recognized as Korean-made and entitled to duty-reduced or duty-
free import into the United States. Such provisions may help end North Korea‟s isolation and 
contribute to conditions for lasting peace on the peninsula.  
 
In addition, the KORUS FTA would deepen people-to-people ties between the Korea and the 
United States. There are over two million Americans of Korean descent living in the United 
States. They have had a huge positive impact on the United States and continue to provide a 
vital and unique link between the two nations. Korea-U.S. academic ties have also 
blossomed: in 2006, more than 58,000 Korean students studied in the United States, the third 
largest group of foreign students in the country. The KORUS FTA has the potential to join 
the two peoples together even more closely. It would transform the previously security-
oriented alliance into a comprehensive partnership by integrating both economic and cultural 
cooperation at the bilateral, regional and global levels. With the KORUS FTA, the Korea-U.S. 
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relationship could grow to be a multi-faceted, cooperative partnership for a more closely-
linked world. 
 
Second, it is worth emphasizing the regional implications of the KORUS FTA. Korea was the 
third-largest contributor of troops to the coalition forces in Iraq and has also played an 
important role in Afghanistan. Both Korean and U.S. governments have discussed not just the 
situation on the Peninsula, but also the Middle East, climate change, democracy, and other 
global issues of shared concern. They have been working hard on modernizing their security 
relationship on a global dimension.        
 
The United States is now realigning its troops stationed in Korea to more effectively deter 
aggression by North Korea. The United States has also been working very closely with 
partners of the Six-Party Talks to deal with North Korea‟s nuclear program and move beyond 
denuclearization. Ultimately, the talks may evolve into a stronger multilateral mechanism for 
regional problem-solving and for developing a greater sense of community in the region. In 
this regard, the KORUS FTA can be a bridge for ensuring geopolitical stability between the 
Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. 
 
The KORUS FTA can function as an institutional anchor that stimulates regional economic 
cooperation in East Asia, a region intricately intertwined with the United States in economic 
matters.
23
 In 2006 alone, the United States incurred a deficit of $232.6 billion with China, 
$88.5 billion with Japan, $13.3 billion with Korea and $15.2 billion with Taiwan. Since the 
U.S. current account deficit is the cause of a number of global economic imbalances, the 
KORUS FTA could help to resolve such issues. U.S companies may also be able to use the 
FTA to strengthen competitive advantage over China and Japan. As the smallest of the three 
East Asian countries, Korea can use this opportunity to increase its political and economic 
clout as a “counterweight” in the region. 
 
Finally, the caveat is that a more consolidated ROK-U.S. alliance promoted by the KORUS 
FTA might make China and North Korea feel isolated and destabilize rather than stabilize the 
regional political economic situation. This possibility is further reinforced by the idea of 
extending an upgraded and updated Korea-U.S. security-economic alliance to a tripartite 
alliance between Korea, Japan, and the United States. China may perceive such a move as a 
renewed effort of containment against China and be driven to take more unilateral and 
                                            
23
 The KORUS FTA would also provide the United States with a strong economic presence 
in Northeast Asia and allow South Korea to reduce its economic dependence on China. Former U.S. envoy 
Christopher Hill alluded to this strengthening of America‟s strategic presence in Northeast Asia when he stated 
that “South Korea can solidify a role as America‟s economic bridge in the Northeast Asian region” through an 
FTA. Christopher R. Hill, “Remarks at American Chamber of Commerce General Membership Meeting,” 
October 5, 2004. 
Domestic Stakeholders Center for U.S.-Korea Policy  
 18 
aggressive actions against the trilateral partnership. The potential isolation of China would do 
more harm than good to resolving the North Korean nuclear issue and enhancing East Asian 
regional cooperation. In a worst case scenario, the KORUS FTA could diffuse U.S.-China 
rivalries in East Asia onto the global stage. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has examined the influence and role of Korean businesses in shaping the ROK-
U.S. alliance, using the KORUS FTA as a case study highlighting momentum toward the 
transformation of the military alliance into a comprehensive partnership based on close 
security, economic and cultural ties.  
 
The existing dominant perspectives on Korea‟s foreign policy and relations with the United 
States have focused on high politics and state actors while overlooking the roles of societal 
actors, business sectors in particular. To fill this void, I analyzed the influences of Korea‟s 
big businesses on the development of the KORUS FTA and implications for the ROK-U.S. 
alliance. Until recently, the room for societal actors in influencing the alliance was very 
limited. In particular, Korean big firms benefited from Korea-U.S. security cooperation in the 
past as a client vis-à-vis their patron, that is, the Korean government and the United States, 
the provider of various economic assistance. Facing the challenges to, and skepticism about, 
the ROK-U.S. alliance in the first half of the 2000s, Korean businesses became more 
assertive supporters of the alliance and the KORUS FTA.  
 
Under the signed FTA, Korean large firms would be on the side of winners, and farmers on 
the opposite side. To push their FTA agenda to both governments, Korean businesses made 
use of advocacy and educational initiatives and formed policy networks at both domestic and 
international levels. The U.S.-Korea Business Council and the FTA Industry Alliance 
monitored government-level FTA negotiations, disseminated policy briefs and reports to 
government officials, and mobilized domestic supporters through educational activities. 
 
The KORUS FTA would have major positive implications bilaterally and regionally, and on 
strategic and economic relations between Korea and the United States. It could be a catalyst 
for deepening the Korea-U.S. security, commercial, and cultural partnership. It would serve 
as a stepping stone to inducing North Korea to integrate into the global community and 
thereby reduce geopolitical uncertainty on the peninsula. Given that Korea is a bridging 
nation in East Asia politically and economically, the KORUS FTA would not only accelerate 
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the process of East Asian integration, but also strengthen the stabilizing role of the United 
States in the region. 
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